Introduction
Scholars of economic development have become increasingly avid students of economic institutions. Studies abound on the norms, rules, and organizations that regulate and, to varying degrees, coordinate a society's productive activities. Few would now question Dani Rodrik's conclusion that "the quality of institutions is key" for economic growth.
Yet our growing understanding of the economic impacts of these ins titutions has not been matched by our understanding of their political origins. 3 In this essay, we aim to narrow this gap by providing a political account of the emergence of a particular type of institutional arrangement: "developmental states." We define developmental states as organizational complexes in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate with organized private sectors to spur national economic transformation. As many scholars have argued, in the small number of countries where they emerged, these institutional features were key to an unparalleled capacity for the promotion of economic development.
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But why do these institutional arrangements emerge? In contrast to scholars who portray developmental states as highly autonomous entities, unconstrained by coalitional demands, we contend that developmental states will only emerge when political leaders confront extraordinarily constrained political environments. Specifically, we argue that political elites will only build such ins titutional arrangements when simultaneously staring down the barrels of three different guns: (1) the credible threat that any deterioration in the living standards of popular sectors could trigger unmanageable mass unrest; (2) the heightened need for foreign exchange and war materiel induced by national insecurity; and (3) the hard budget constraints imposed by a scarcity of easy revenue sources. We call this interactive condition "systemic vulnerability."
Developmental states are significant but rare. In the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, these institutional apparatuses have enhanced information flows both within and between the public and private sector, giving bureaucrats the 3 Bates 1995. 4 Foundational studies include Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; and Haggard 1990 . Subsequent work includes Noble 1998; Woo 1991; Evans 1995; Kuo 1995; and McNamara 1999 . We retain the term developmental wherewithal to help firms compete with global rivals in more challenging economic activities.
Just as critically, these institutional arrangements have given bureaucrats the political clout to make credible but conditional commitments, and thus to withdraw support from firms that underperform in spite of state assistance. Solving information and commitment problems has helped these states coordinate multiple actors and pursue long-term economic objectives. The result has been an impressive level of "upgrading": shifts, based on growth in local innovation capacities, from lower-value to higher-value economic activities within global commodity chains. In other words, these countries combined export promotion with industrial deepening. This distinguishes the NICs from Southeast Asia's high-growth "ASEAN-4" 5 (Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia), where "intermediate" state institutions have been associated with impressive growth and economic diversification, but very little upgrading. 6 Analysts differ as to the ultimate benefits of the interventionist policies developmental states have pursued. Yet even economists skeptical as to their benefits agree that, because such policies have been "institutionally demanding," the particular institutions comprising developmental states were critical to whatever benefits resulted from them. Since developmental failure appears to represent institutional failure, and not just policy failure, our aim in this essay is to explain why "these conditions...[of institutional capacity]...rarely obtain." 7 Institutional capacity is our dependent variable.
state because the goals and organizational features of private sector arrangements are strongly a function of state incentives. 5 "ASEAN" is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 6 "Intermediate" states exhibit much less coherent bureaucracies and combinations of more pervasive clientelism and isolated autonomy (Evans 1995: 60) , In this essay, the causal relationship between developmental states and economic performance is presumed, not proven. . For arguments that institutions are key for upgrading, see Evans 1995; Wade 1990; Amsden 2001; and Waldner 1999 . On the important distinction between upgrading and diversification (or structural change), see Gereffi 2004; Waldner 1999; and Weiss 1998 . For empirical studies of economic performance differences between the NICs and the ASEAN-4, see Amsden 2001; Wong and Ng 2001; Booth 1999; and Rasiah 2003 . 7 Pack 2000 , 64. See also World Bank 1993 and Page 1994. Any explanation for the scarcity of developmental states must be a political one.
Economic institutions ultimately arise from the rough-and-tumble of elite politics, not from choices by private parties to enhance mutual welfare. 8 But politicians are primarily motivated by concerns with securing their own power. This typically leads them to de-emphasize the provision of broad collective goods and to fashion institutions as vehicles for channeling largesse to key constituencies -typically economic elites interested in easy profits through speculation and rent seeking -rather than serving any of the more virtuous economic functions noted above.
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Political incentives typically lead neither to shared goals of national economic transformation, nor to the creation of monitoring devices and incentive structures through which political leaders (principals) control the bureaucrats (agents) who implement such goals. 10 We thus cannot explain developmental states as a result of either benign motivations or "state autonomy." Rather, to avoid the "thin politics" that has characterized most work on developmental states, we must specify the constraints that make it difficult for politicians to preserve power through clientelist connections to the private sector alone, as well as the incentives that encourage them to build new institutions for economic transformation.
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In this essay, we argue that the political origins of developmental states can be located in conditions of "systemic vulnerability," or the simultaneous interplay of three separate constraints: (1) broad coalitional commitments, (2) scarce resource endowments, and (3) severe security threats. Any subset of these constraints might make it somewhat more difficult for rulers to stay in power without improving institutional performance.
Even mild constraints might inspire politicians to forego their individual interest in 8 Bates 1995; Knight 1992; Moe 1948 . 9 Geddes 1994. 10 Moe 1984. 11 On "thin politics," see Wade 1992; Moon and Prasad 1998; and Haggard 2004. maximizing patronage resources, and press them to convert the bureaucracy into "more of an instrument, less of an arena." 12 But there is a cavernous gap between the political will necessary to build such "intermediate" states and that which is required to construct a developmental state. 13 Unless political leaders are confronted by all three of these constraints at the same time, we argue that they will find less challenging ways of staying in power (Figure 1 ). In sum, leaders such as South Korea's Park Chung Hee, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, and Taiwan's Chiang Kai-Shek only took the lead in building developmental states because they were more tightly bound, not more brilliant or benign, than their counterparts throughout the developing world.
Our argument thus suggests that the interactive condition of systemic vulnerability is both a necessary and sufficient condition for developmental states. We make this structuralist argument in deterministic rather than probabilistic terms not to deny the agency of state leaders, but to facilitate falsification. If future research uncovers instances when leadership failures (or other factors) forestalled the emergence of developmental states, even though all three conditions were in effect, the sufficient argument can be considered falsified. If examples of developmental states can be shown to have eme rged in the absence of systemic vulnerability, i.e. when one or more of the three conditions were absent, our necessary argument can be considered falsified. Until such evidence is proffered, we treat leadership and agency as epiphenomenal out of our methodological concern for parsimony, rather than any ontological conviction that agency and leadership never matter.
12 Emmerson 1978, 105. 13 See Evans (1995, 60) How can politicians build and hold together a broad coalition when revenues are desperately needed for national defense, and when there is precious little revenue to go around?
Only by continuously expanding the national pie through sustained growth, yet without pursuing a cheap-labor, "race to the bottom" strategy that could alienate coalition members. We thus anticipate that systemic vulnerability will press elites to abandon low-wage-based export growth for a higher-skill, quality-based export trajectory. Elites must thus design side payments without draining the national treasury or raising exporters' costs. In other words, sustaining broad coalitions over the long run requires the ability to export high value-added goods, viz. to upgrade. States exhibiting weak or even "intermediate" institutions lack the capacity to overcome these political-economic challenges.
14 By "ruling elites," we refer to the political leaders atop the incumbent regime. By "broad coalitions," we mean those in which ruling elites provide tangible benefits to popular sectors in exchange for political support or acquiescence. By "severe external threat," we mean situations in which outsiders credibly threaten not merely to initiate a military dispute or seize valued territory, but to terminate the target state as a sovereign political unit. By "resource constraints," we refer to a condition in which states enjoy access to neither credible long-term commitments of foreign assistance nor easily exploited commodity resources. 15 Riker 1962. Our suggestion that developmental states partly reflect elite responses to popular pressures might seem counterintuitive, given both the undeniably authoritarian nature of these regimes when these institutions were built, as well as recent work highlighting the contribution of democratic regimes to the provision of public goods. 16 But while popular sectors have been politically subordinated and even brutally repressed in the NICs, they have rarely been economically ignored. The key to the NICs' robust economic institutions lies in how popular sectors have been compensated for their political marginalization.
Our interactive concept of systemic vulnerability remedies several weaknesses in existing accounts of developmental states. First, we improve on accounts that treat leaders' preferences as exogenous or fixed. Variation in systemic vulnerability helps explain, for instance, why leaders frequently fail to take advantage of existing institutional endowments. In the Korean case, for example, such variation over time is vital to understanding shifts in ruling elites' commitment to utilizing Japanese colonial legacies of a strong bureaucracy and large business groups.
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We also address gaps in work by scholars whose explicit analysis of elite constraints has inspir ed our own thinking. We echo Chalmers Johnson's emphasis on nationalism and MeredithWoo Cumings' analysis of security threats as key to the potency of patriotism in Northeast Asia.
But we suggest that the impact of security threats has been critically compounded by resource constraints and coalitional pressures, which channeled nationalist impulses into the building of stronger economic institutions. 18 We also build on the work of David Waldner as well as Edgardo Campos and Hilton Root, for whom coalitiona l pressures are key to institutional 16 Baum and Lake 2003. We return to this issue in the conclusion. 17 Kohli 1999; Kang 2002. 18 Woo-Cumings 1998; Johnson 1982. formation. 19 But as we show below, our own conclusions differ from these authors' in several important respects. By specifying the causal mechanisms through which broad coalitions shape developmental states, we provide a more robust explanation for intra-Asian institutional variation than has been offered to date.
We elaborate and assess our argument through a comparative-historical analysis of seven countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Section II specifies our dependent variable and establishes the empirical puzzle of these two regions' substantial institutional variation. In
Section III, we first use the methods of difference and agreement to eliminate several rival hypotheses as necessary explanations. We the n demonstrate the potential causal importance of systemic vulnerability: Drawing on a broad range of research, we note the shortcomings of arguments that rest on any subset of its component variables, and we suggest that addressing the simultaneous presence of all three conditions requires strong institutions.
We assess our argument in two steps. In Section IV, we demonstrate that the Korea and Taiwan cases both confirm its plausibility and provide insight as to how systemic vulnerability promotes institut ional development. This exercise does not constitute a test of our arguments:
Korea and Taiwan lack variation on both our independent and dependent variables; they themselves are the source of prior explanations from which we have developed our own approach; and our examination of the two cases generates insights as to how our key causal mechanism, side payments, promoted institutional creation. Specifically, we show that the NICs experienced an incremental process of institutional development. While this process initially involved the construction of institutions capable of providing challenging types of side payments, systemic vulnerability subsequently inspired the elaboration of full-blown developmental state arrangements, designed to facilitate the shift from easy export promotion 19 Waldner 1999; Campos and Root 1996. and first-stage import substitution to the export of higher-value-added products based on domestic inputs.
In section V, we test our hypotheses through cross-national and within-case analyses of all five developing capitalist nations of Southeast Asia: Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 20 By matching cross-and within-case patterns with expectations derived from Korea and Taiwan, we find initial confirmation of our core arguments. We then extend our analysis from nominal variation (viz., the presence of a developmental state in Singapore vs. the absence of developmental states in the ASEAN-4) to ordinal differences, by identifying and accounting for more fine-grained variance in institutional capacity within the ASEAN-4 itself. Finally, through historical process tracing, we identify key temporal sequences to confirm the causal validity of our argument.
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This essay extends the study of developmental state origins beyond the usual focus on the Northeast Asian NICs. However, our design does not allow us to vary certain broad regional features, such as Japanese economic dynamism and U.S. security interests. But at this stage of theory development and testing, we believe it preferable to elaborate our hypotheses in some depth, and to limit our assessment of their validity to one world region. Our claims of generalizability outside Northeast and Southeast Asia thus await subsequent testing. Section VI reviews our empirical argument and situates it within wider theoretical debates in political science and political economy.
II. The Institutional Features of Developmental States
What specific features give institutions the capacity to solve the information, Although one finds "pockets of bureaucratic efficiency" and functional public-private sector linkages, these either serve non-economic ends, such as managing communal politics in Malaysia, or govern economic domains that are necessary but far from sufficient for upgrading, such as macroeconomics in Thailand.
What accounts for this striking intra-Asian variation in institutional features?
24 Schneider and Maxfield 1997; Kuo 1995 25 On inter-NIC differences, see Wong and Ng 2001. 26 On corruption in Korea and Taiwan, see Kang (2002) and Fields (1997) . 27 Evans 1995, Ch. 3.
III. The Argument
Scholars have cited a number of factors as possible explanations for the institutional capacity that drove the NICs' economic success. Emphasizing the importance of "initial conditions," Atul Kohli has argued that "Japanese colonialism, as brutal as it was," created new "state structures" and "patterns of state-class relations" which helped post-colonial ruling elites Three factors identified in the broader state-building literature and explored in the Northeast Asian context prove more useful. But the utility of each of these variables is limited when considered in isolation.
Broad Coalitions : Despite their well-known preference for "minimum winning coalitions," politicians can be induced to broaden coalitions under specific conditions.
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Whenever elite and/or social conflict are perceived by political elites as intense or imminent during the early stages of state formation, coalitions tend to be broadened; where such conflicts are muted or absent, coalitions tend to remain comparatively narrow. 34 Sustaining a broad coalition is not costless: it typically requires that elites provide side payments -goods and services "that can conceivably have value" for coalition partners. 35 For our purposes, the key point is that these side payments have important institutional impacts.
David Waldner argues that side payments to popular sectors inexorably increase producers' costs and swamp institutions with particularistic demands. Waldner thus concludes that narrow rather than broad coalitions were a necessary condition for the emergence of developmental states in Korea and Taiwan. 36 Yet he does not posit any causal mechanism linking narrow coalitions to developmental states, leaving the reader to wonder why ruling elites facing mild coalitional constraints would seek to strengthen the state rather than simply stealing it. Further, while rightly highlighting the dangers of populist subsidies and uncond itional 33 Riker 1962, 88-89. 34 See Waldner 1999, 29; Hechter and Brustein 1980; and Crone 1988 for an application to Southeast Asia. 35 Riker 1962 , 105. 36 Waldner 1999 protection, Waldner unnecessarily precludes the possibility that ruling elites might deliver side payments with more salutary effects. There is in fact theoretical and empirical support for the view that the pursuit of selective benefits and rents may result in the "joint production" of both private and public goods. Although such arguments commonly refer to benefits accruing to business, they might also involve broad benefits to popular sectors, such as education and rural infrastructure, that can encourage productivity rather than profligacy.
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As we show below, certain types of side payments actually lower factor costs rather than raising them, enhancing rather than undermining a country's export competitiveness. Woo-Cumings 1998, 322; Campos and Root 1996. 41 On Latin America, see Centeno 1997 Centeno , 1569 . On the Middle East, see Barnett 1992 . 42 Campos and Root 1996, 58-59. institutions, and Michael Ross has proposed that this "resource curse" encourages politicians to dismantle state institutions in order to "seize" rents. 44 These arguments help to account for variation in institutional capacity between resource-rich and resource-poor economies. Indeed, Rajah Rasiah argues that natural-resource exports reduced fiscal pressure on the ASEAN-4 to promote the kinds of "complementary institutional and linkage development" that occurred in the NICs.
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But such arguments cannot account for institutional differences between countries with relatively similar resource endowments. Examples include the stark variation in institutional capacity between the Northeast Asian NICs and the resource-poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa, as well as differences between resource-rich countries such as Malaysia and Venezuela, or between Botswana, a country with both diamonds and strong institutions, and its resource-rich but often predatory African neighbors. 46 Underlying all of these weaknesses is a failure to provide a full theory of elite preferences and constraints. As Ross rightly notes, this literature mistakenly assumes that states are invariably revenue satisficers, not revenue maximizers.
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Whether states satisfice or maximize revenue, we argue, depends fundamentally on the coalitional and geopolitical context in which they are forced to operate.
Systemic Vulnerability: Broad coalitions and external security needs constitute two critical claims on scarce resources that press ruling elites to become revenue maximizers. Under such vulnerable conditions, "easy" development strategies become difficult: shortages of foreign exchange to import inputs for domestic producers means simply subsidizing unprofitable local 43 Centeno 1997 43 Centeno , 1569 . 44 Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Ross 2001; Shafer 1994 . On resources and growth, see Auty 1994; Sachs and Warner 1995. 45 Rasiah 2003 , 66. Similarly, Booth (1999 stresses the negative impacts of "easy to tax" sectors in the See the chapters in Rodrik 2003 . 47 Ross 1999, 313. firms is unsustainable; coalitional obstacles to squeezing wages weaken the long-term feasibility of labor-intensive industrialization; and the lack of foreign exchange makes it difficult to grow simply by buying costly foreign technology. When elites face high levels of systemic vulnerability, they necessarily confront the challenge of simultaneously improving living standards and promoting growth by continuously upgrading local resources.
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Reconciling these competing political pressures requires strong institutions. Elites confronting systemic vulnerability must go beyond ensuring property rights, establishing macroeconomic stability, and socializing the risks of new investments. They are also pressed to redistribute assets, such as land, identify areas for new investments with real market potential, establish education and training programs that upgrade skills valued by the market, and set up manufacturing and agricultural extension programs that improve the competitiveness of firms.
Implementing policies in these areas poses particular challenges: They require the active "buy-in" of numerous parties. They have important distributional implications, with benefits often taking longer to appear than costs. They require considerable information, often of a specialized nature. And they lack clear "templates." In these situations, "Policy makers are dealing in much more complex political environments and often walking blind as to what needs to be done to resolve issues of public importance."
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Policy implementation under these conditions thus requires institutions able to formulate broad developmental objectives; to facilitate information flows within state agencies and between officials and private actors regarding market requirements; to monitor firms' performance; and to be credible in terms of both commitment to economic policies and willingness to exact reciprocity. Such capacities require Weberian bureaucracies led by pilot agencies "embedded" in organized sets of private interests. Even the smartest policies cannot implement themselves.
IV. South Korea and Taiwan
In both Korea and Taiwan, leaders created institutions to meet the political and economic challenges of systemic vulnerability in three stages. Both began with rural development and import substitution during the early-mid 1950s, shifted to labor-intensive export promotion in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and moved to industrial deepening and upgrading by the early 1970s.
Each of these steps involved important elements of institutional growth and adaptation -but it was the third step, when political leaders faced a fateful choice between expanding manufactured exports through cutting wages vs. raising productivity, which marked the maturation of developmental state institutions. Yet agriculture alone could not bankroll the Taiwanese and Korean war machines, even when supplemented by moderate levels of American aid. These states' simultaneous drives to promote manufactured exports and import substitution of key upstream inputs in the 1950s were explicitly predicated on their shared inability to finance security and import needs through agricultural exports. 62 But while the import substitution policy was successfully implemented, the export drive lacked the institutional foundations to succeed. In Taiwan, for example, the Bank of Taiwan guaranteed a few privileged firms handsome profits through supplies of raw 58 Nordhaug 1997. 59 Wade 1982. 60 Nordhaug 1997, 181 . In addition to providing key agricultural inputs, government-sponsored organizationstenancy committees -solved over 62,000 landlord -tenant disputes between 1952 -1956 . 61 Politically, side payments encouraged a sense of shared growth that reduced uncertainty for risk-averse firms and dampened popular (especially rural) discontent (Root 1996, 8; Amsden 2001, 245) . In Taiwan, land reform fostered forward linkages and increased agricultural exports (Wade 1982, 76) . Korean rural reforms directed capital away from land speculation, weakened landlords opposing agricultural modernization, and, by cutting rural-urban migration, "buttressed manufacturing wage rates" (Amsden 1989, 37; 203 Both countries faced significant challenges in financing this domestic industrialization effort. Labor-intensive ma nufactured exports were running into competition from cheaper rivals in the region, thus generating fears that continually increasing wages would price these countries' products out of world markets.
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Meanwhile, low-skill industries lacked the technology to confront more efficient producers such as Japan.
65 Nordhaug 1997, 248-265. 66 Ibid., 255; 266; Kuo 1995. 67 Fields 1997, 136. 68 This discussion draws on Woo-Cumings 1998, 332-334; Zhu 2001; Nordhaug 1998, 144 . 69 Woo 1991, Ch. 5. 70 Amsden 1994, 632; and idem. 200, 244-248. Korea and Taiwan therefore had only two realistic alternatives in their efforts to become internationally competitive: either cut real wages or raise the productivity of domestic firms and workers. Although these authoritarian regimes could jail individual political opponents, they feared the potential political backlash that could arise from severely disadvantaging labor as a whole. Squeezing wages would have been political dynamite. Both therefore took the productivity path by raising the domestic value added of increasingly sophisticated exports.
An important source of value added was domestic upstream suppliers. Given hard budget constraints, however, upstream industries would have to pay for themselves. They did so by serving downstream producers who had to be globally competitive. 71 For instance, Taiwan's need to improve the quality of textile and footwear exports in the face of low-wage competition was a key impetus for the growth of the country's petrochemical, dyeing, and finishing industries. 72 Perhaps the most striking illustration of "downstream pressure" comes from one of Korea's security-inspired heavy industries -the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO).
Unlike large-scale steel initiatives in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, Korea's strategy focused on the need "to interface nationally owned upstream and downstream economic activities."
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Implementing such an ambitious linkage strategy required benefits to labor -rising wages and cheap education -that could (1) forestall mass opposition to large-scale business subsidies, and (2) The experiences of South Korea and Taiwan thus serve to confirm the plausibility of our contention that developmental institutions arose from the challenges of addressing popular pressures through the provision of side payments under hard budget constraints in a highly constrained geopolitical environment. In Southeast Asia, only Singapore has replicated this condition of systemic vulnerability.
V. Southeast Asia

Singapore
With a coherent and capable bureaucracy that consults extensively with business and labor, Singapore possesses the institutional profile of a developmental state. This profile emerged from ruling elites' efforts to contend with the simultaneous presence of a highly mobilized labor movement, a precarious regional security environment, and a dearth of revenues from 80 Amsden 2001, 279; idem 1989. 81 Research by scholars such as Kuo (1995) and McNamara (1999) demonstrates not only the extent and developmental significance of these arrangements, but also their organizational complexity. 82 Weiss 1998, 51-52; Kim 1997, 48-52. commodity exports or external patrons. Singapore's ruling elites have famously confronted these threats with significant political repression. 83 Yet they have also done so through "wealth-sharing mechanisms" which, given hard budget constraints, have demanded continuous state attention to fostering national competitiveness. This effort to improve living standards on the basis of a more efficient economy involved the construction of strong institutions.
Singapore's road to independence Singapore responded by modeling its development strategy after Israel, another resource poor, geopolitically insecure country. 90 Economically, the strategy involved "leapfrogging" unfriendly regional markets and pursuing full-fledged integration in the global economy.
Politically, it meant the PAP needed to sustain its broad coalition with side payments that would not raise exporters' costs.
It accomplished this in four ways. First, to help Singaporeans own their own homes, the government created the Housing Development Board (HDB) to subsidize land, building prices, and home financing. 91 Second, education was prioritized and subsidized, with a special focus on technical training. Third, the PAP restored perks and introduced an aggressive pay scale for the civil service. Finally, the state forced firms to increase their contributions to the Central Provident Fund (CPF); allowed workers to access CPF funds to pay for housing, education, and health needs; and allowed workers to buy discounted shares in Government Linked Corporations (GLCs).
These side payments did not impose cost burdens on industrialists. Cheaper housing dissipated upward pressure on wages, improved education meant improved productivity, and high salaries helped the bureaucracy attract many of the city-state's best and brightest. Indeed, these side payments proved critical to Singapore's capacity to earn foreign exchange and generate jobs through export-led growth.
The pursuit of such growth itself -initially through labor-intensive manufacturing, and subsequently through skill-based upgrading -involved the creation of institutions that facilitated ongoing labor and business participation with public officials in policy formulation and implementation. Initial labor-intensive manufacturing required soliciting and coordinating foreign capital through Singapore's "pilot agency," the EDB. The EDB's expertise, coherence, and political backing helped Singapore establish itself in low-cost manufacturing, reaching full employment by the early 1970s. 92 But this caused wages to rise more rapidly than labor productivity. 93 The government's initial response -freezing wages -threatened to alienate labor and induce a low-wage, low-skill trap. Thus, in 1972 the go vernment created another institution, 91 Rodan 1989. 92 Schein 1996 . 93 Rodan 1989, 106. the National Wage Council, comprised of representatives from foreign and local business, as well as labor and government, to keep wages pegged to productivity increases.
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In 1979, under pressure from low-cost competitors, the government launched the "Second Industrial Revolution" to solicit higher value-added, skill-intensive, and capitalintensive investments, while phasing out subsidies for labor-intensive industries. 95 This required matching skills with industry demand. To do so, the government created a Skills Development
Fund, generating funds to expand training and involving both business and labor in designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating training programs. 96 The government also encouraged wages to ris e to market levels.
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However, this again forced wages up faster than productivity, inciting opposition from employers. The PAP rescinded the measure, realizing it could not afford to scare off foreign capital. But neither did it relish the risk of squeezing workers' wages too hard. The solution was
to create institutions such as the Productivity and Standards Board and Institutes for Technical Education, through which labor worked with management to improve productivity.
Combined with the FDI boom of the mid-1980s, these measures relieved some of the pressure of reconciling wages with skills and productivity growth. But in the early 1990s, the familiar tension between wages and productivity resurfaced. This time, the state coupled its demands for improved wo rker productivity with pressure on both local and foreign-owned firms to upgrade. In addition to restructuring its grants to favor firms willing to invest in R&D, the Rodan 1989, 142. thirteen quasi-public institutes, in collaboration with foreign firms, to encourage research in new markets such as data storage; and engaged labor and business in the formation of development plans based on overlapping clusters of economic activities.
In sum, institutional development in Singapore was driven by the PAP's political need to promote growth in both wages and productivity against a backdrop of resource scarcity and external insecurity. The institutions that arose to meet these challenges have helped Singapore avoid becoming trapped in a low-wage development strategy, and facilitated upgrading by helping firms adapt to the exigencies of rapid economic change.
Thailand
The emergence of a centralized Thai state in the mid-late-nineteenth century prompted predictions that the country's economy would surpass that of Meiji Japan. 98 Such expectations
were not fulfilled, we suggest, because Thailand's ruling elites fa ced less systemic vulnerability than elites in Japan (or Korea, Taiwan, or Singapore). Periods of tightening constraints have prompted impressive bursts of institutional creation. Yet these constraints have never been so severe or sustained as to press ruling Thai elites to build the sort of bureaucratic capacity and public-private linkages that fostered upgrading in Singapore. Thai elites have intermittently confronted broad coalitional pressures, external threats, and resource constraints, but never all three at once.
The modern Thai state was formed in the second half of the nineteenth century in the face of imminent colonial threats. But fortuitous positioning as a buffer between French and British possessions allowed Thai monarchs to preserve nationa l sovereignty through negotiations rather than war. Avoiding annexation required national fiscal autonomy, which came from exponential growth in exports of rice, tin, rubber, and sugar. Finally, early Thai state-builders confronted little elite or social conflict. Modernizing monarchs faced no entrenched landlord class, while a vast land frontier weakened tendencies toward peasant unrest.
Side payments during the 1855-1945 period were minimal, while institutional development was impressive but limited. Bo rders had to be secured, in part through the construction of railroads; but the necessary steel and technology could be imported with profits from bountiful agricultural exports, which, in turn, required macroeconomic stability, greater revenue collection, and efficient trade administration. All of this was achieved through the creation of a centralized civilian bureaucracy that "ran the provinces, kept the peace, collected the taxes, and educated the children." 99 But land abundance and easy commodity exports allowed Thai ruling elites to neglect basic institutions in agriculture such as property rights and irrigation. Elites also considered but rejected productivity-related institutions in rubber, silk, and shipbuilding. 100 Thus was born a tradition of extensive rather than intensive growth. helped ignite an export boom in the late 1980s that absorbed low-skilled workers from the inefficient farm sector, alleviated pressure for improved education and training, and reduced the need for improved competitiveness among domestic firms.
The "good times" of the late 1980s and early 1990s gave way to the scarcity of the postcrisis period of 1997. This familiar shift from revenue plenty to paucity was accompanied by unprecedented levels of populist pressure. Predictably, this combination of constraints has increased incentives to expand institutional capacity as ruling elites struggle to finance side payments in the context of shrinking revenues and fierce electoral competition. Thailand's initial response to the crisis, under the Democrat Party, had two components. One was to address the country's lack of value added, innovation, and competitiveness through bureaucratic reform and extensive public-private sector consultation. 111 This upgrading initiative was largely overshadowed, however, by neoliberal policies reflecting IMF views.
Responding to widespread dissatisfaction with the effects of IMF orthodoxy, the Thai Rak Thai party won an unprecedented, near-majority victory in the 2000 elections with promises to slow liberalization and increase redistribution. The TRT aimed to prove its populist intentions by quickly introducing a large-scale village fund and a universal health-care scheme.
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Recognizing that financing these side payments over the long term will require improving industrial competitiveness-a task for which Thai institutions are ill-prepared-the TRT has passed bureaucratic reforms, created a National Committee on Competitiveness, increased the roles of industry "institutes" for public-private sector consultation, modified the Board of Investment to emphasize "quality-over-quantity" in FDI promotion, and initiated efforts to reform education and improve vocational training. Broad coalitional pressures in Indonesia and Malaysia have clearly forced ruling elites to worry seriously about promoting growth and structural change to generate foreign exchange and employment for supporters. But as in the Philippines, the absence of external threat and rarity of revenue shortfalls have permitted ruling elites to avoid the hard political work of institutionbuilding in areas beyond property rights and price stabilization. Elite commitment to even such basic "first-generation" institutions has wavered in good times while returning to steadfastness only when times turn bad. Such an institutional profile has permitted more impressive growth and diversification in Indonesia and Malaysia than in the Philippines, but not any significant national upgrading.
V. Conclusion
As an exercise in empirical analysis, this essay has aimed to unravel the political origins of developmental and non-developmental states in Northeast and Southeast Asia. We have argued that ruling elites in the NICs constructed coherent bureaucracies and public-private consultative mechanisms in response to a similar set of political-economic constraints: All were 116 Jesudason 1989. 117 For example, BULOG continued to be effective in stabilizing rice prices without major distortion even through Indonesia's oil boom. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this fact. 118 Biddle and Milor 2000. pressed to build and maintain broad coalitions and to address security threats without easy access to revenues. In contrast, ruling elites in the ASEAN-4 never confronted such a threatening mix of geopolitical, coalitional, and fiscal cons traints. "Intermediate states" thus provided these countries' ruling groups with ample institutional capacity to sustain coalitions and preserve national sovereignty.
Our empirical analysis has also helped us identify a somewhat surprising causal mechanism through which systemic vulnerability actually produces developmental states.
Contrary to common views that developmental states were built by utterly unconstrained and ungenerous ruling elites, we have found that the side payments these elites delivered to popular sectors "called forth" impressive new institutional capacities in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
This was an incremental process. Without building new institutions, policies designed to secure mass acquiescence such as land reform, advanced technical training, and subsidized public housing could never have been effectively implemented. Given the fiscal constraints imposed by revenue paucity and daunting defense commitments, ruling elites did not enjoy the luxury of coopting a restive mass pub lic with more expensive but less institutionally unchallenging types of side payments. Nor was it politically feasible to pursue a low-wage export strategy based on squeezing labor. Over time, then, upholding broad coalitions amid severe fiscal constraints came to require the pursuit of both export promotion and increased domestic inputs, all without sacrificing wage buoyancy. This strategy entailed extensive institutional capacity.
Accounting for these Asian outliers allows us to address broader debates as to the conditions under which political self-interest drives ruling elites to provide growth-promoting public goods and, by implication, to construct better institutions for governance. Implicitly challenging the benefits of "state autonomy," recent scholarship stresses the contribution of democracy to the provision of public goods, such as education. 119 Drawing on market models, this view argues that democracy's competitive pressures limit states' ability to garner and distribute monopoly rents to themselves and a narrow band of supporters. But while democracy is a valuable end in itself, it does not always yield either more capable or more generous states.
Democratic competition might inspire improved institutional performance and increased public provision when it helps induce elite vulnerability, as seen in contemporary Thailand. But where ruling elites develop such a stronghold on power resources that they can preserve power without delivering significant side payments, as we see in the Philippines, the "invisible hand of democracy" fails to deliver the goods.
Nor should we assume that constraints on elite actions are confined to democracies. The primary lesson of state-building in Northeast and Southeast Asia has been that systemic vulnerability, far more than electoral vulnerability, has driven ruling elites to improve institutional performance. At first blush, this argument might seem crudely functionalist. But it is perfectly consistent with conventional, rationalist premises regarding elite preferences.
Developmental states have not arisen from political leaders' selfless love of nation and accompanying recognition that new institutions could help maximize national wealth. Rather, developmental states have arisen from political leaders' recognition that -under conditions of systemic vulnerability -only coherent bureaucracies and broad public-private linkages could produce the resources necessary to sustain coalitions, secure state survival, and thereby maximize their own time in office.
We have tested the generalizability of this argument outside Northeast Asia, where our and others' hypotheses regarding the origins of developmental states have been generated.
Because Southeast Asia exhibits significant variation on both our key independent variables and 119 Lake and Baum 2001; Baum and Lake 2003. on the dependent variable of institutional capacity, it has provided a useful venue for testing our hypotheses. We also believe that our argument is consistent with research outside the Asian theater, such as scholarship on the origins of "non-liberal capitalisms" in the industrialized world and on institutional variation in Africa. 120 Our hope is that the hypotheses generated and tested here inspire assessments of our arguments on a broader scale. 120 Streeck 2001; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 2003; Acemoglu, et.al. 2003 .
